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Abstract 
In this study, through the lens of critical realism to power, we take a close look into the power dynamics 
behind the Bitcoin protocol in relation to its Cypherpunk philosophical underpinnings. We focus on 
some of its main components that can be seen as constraining structures, and we discuss how these 
structures generate constraining mechanisms that restrict users’ power to act, further reinforcing other 
entities’’ power over them. In doing so, we illustrate that the Bitcoin Protocol, as it is used today, is in 
tension with the principles on which it was developed. In addition, we show that power, instead of being 
decentralised and distributed to the many, it has merely shifted from traditional actors to what can be 
seen as newcomers or atypical regulators. In line with the paradigm of critical realism, we note that the 
identified mechanisms and structures we discuss in this paper, are those that we were able to observe 
through our subjective lens; others may exist but may require different contextual conditions to be 
activated and observed.  
 
Keywords: Bitcoin, Power, decentralisation, critical realism 
 
Zamani /Power and Bitcoins 
 
 
The 13th Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (MCIS), Naples, Italy, 2019 1 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The Bitcoin and the Blockchain technology have been attracting the interest of many researchers and 
practitioners alike on a global scale, primarily because they promise to solve many issues surrounding 
transparency, trust, decentralisation and traceability. About then years after Nakamoto’s original paper 
(Nakamoto, 2008a) on the Bitcoin protocol, the literature exhibits a strong focus on proposing innovative 
use cases (e.g., Creer et al., 2016; Kypriotaki et al., 2015), investigating the desirability and feasibility 
of regulation around it (e.g., Schaupp and Festa, 2018; Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018), as well as 
technical matters concerning security, privacy and risk (e.g., Puthal et al., 2018; Zamani et al., 2018). 
However, a less investigated aspect of the Bitcoin and the Blockchain is that which pertains to their 
underlying philosophy and their links to the Cypherpunk Manifesto (Swartz, 2018; Vidan and 
Lehdonvirta, 2018). The Manifesto recognised as law only what can be illustrated through maths and 
enforced by code, and focuses on the anonymity of the involved parties (Narayanan, 2013). Indeed, 
when the Bitcoin protocol was first introduced, what seemed to spark the interest of users was the 
potential to move from trusting a single regulatory body or state, to trusting anonymous, unknown and 
therefore untrusted peers by leveraging the power of maths and cryptography (Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 
2018). At the same time, what seemed equally promising was the potential to shift the power balance 
from sovereign states and financial institutions to users and citizens thanks to the technology’s 
decentralised nature (Corradi and Höfner, 2018). 
In effect, this was an effort to move from the centralisation of power for authorising and validating 
payments to the decentralisation of the process, where some thousands of peers could all have an equal 
saying in doing so. In other words, what the Bitcoin protocol suggested was that power could effectively 
be distributed across the many rather than being concentrated in the hands of the few. Along these lines, 
fairly recently, a small number of studies begun looking into these attributes of these two technologies, 
and in relation to the promised potential to shift the power balance (Swartz, 2018; Vidan and 
Lehdonvirta, 2018).  
In this paper, we focus our attention on the philosophical underpinnings of the technology, and analyse 
some of its major features in relation to them. Our aim is to showcase that, first, the technology as used 
today is in contrast to these underpinnings, and that second, the trajectory of the Bitcoin and that of the 
Blockchain suggest that power has not been distributed but instead shifted from traditional actors (such 
as states) to newcomers and less typical regulatory bodies. 
The paper is structured as follows. We start off by presenting a short overview of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Bitcoin and the Blockchain. We then introduce our theoretical approach to the 
concept of power. This is followed by a discussion around the tension between the technology’s 
philosophical underpinnings and how it is used today, unpacking the constraining structures and the 
constraining mechanisms, so as to showcase how the Bitcoin protocol is a system of power.  
2 On the Philosophical Origins of the Bitcoin  
Researchers (e.g., Swartz, 2018; Zamani and Babatsikos, 2017) suggest that the idea behind the Bitcoin 
protocol can be found in Chaum’s 1983 proposal for a fully anonymous payment system, that leveraged 
cryptographic protocols to secure the anonymity and the privacy of stakeholders in electronic 
transactions (Chaum, 1983). The need for privacy is a focal point in Hughes’ Cypherpunk’s Manifesto, 
as well, which can only be achieved through anonymity (Hughes, 1993): 
“Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic age. […] privacy in an open society 
requires anonymous transaction systems. […] An anonymous system empowers individuals to 
reveal their identity when desired and only when desired; this is the essence of privacy.” 
Against this background, many of the features and functions in the Bitcoin protocol are firmly aligned 
with each of the themes raised within the Cypherpunk’s Manifesto. For example, the Manifesto 
underlines that “each party to a transaction [should] have knowledge only of that which is directly 
necessary for that transaction” (Hughes, 1993). This, in principle, is satisfied by the use of public key 
cryptography, where each user possesses their own pair of keys for initiating and settling transactions, 
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thus confirming the authenticity of the transaction. Further, Hughes stresses the importance of an open 
and transparent system that is distributed and maintained by the many: “[w]e publish our code so that 
our fellow Cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all to use, worldwide. […] 
We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down.” 
(Hughes, 1993). Indeed, the Bitcoin protocol in essence builds on the concept of a peer-to-peer network, 
where all users are connected to each other over the internet for the purpose of minting new coins, 
transacting with one another and validating transactions. The protocol itself, i.e., the code, is publicly 
available and open to all, for investigation, auditing etc., in the principles of open source code, where 
anybody can access it, identify flaws, or further build their own applications on top of it. 
The most critical theme however that emerges out of the Cypherpunk’s Manifesto is that of the distrust 
regarding the role of governments and corporations: “[w]e cannot expect governments, corporations, or 
other large, faceless organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence. It is to their advantage to 
speak of us, and we should expect that they will speak” (Hughes, 1993). In other words, this underlines 
that the intentions and actions of such institutions are not and should not be considered as benevolent, 
but rather that citizens should actively seek out their autonomy, self-reliance and self-control in order to 
resist institutionalized authority (Coleman and Golub, 2008). Along these lines, and with regards to the 
Bitcoin, its objective was to create a network and an infrastructure that can be trusted, without 
necessarily trusting the peers themselves, but rather the technology and the cryptographical means used 
(Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018), thus removing the need for card issuers, central banks, states and escrow 
services (Westphal, 2015), which are often addressed as corrupt by many of the core developers of the 
Bitcoin (De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016).  
Because the Bitcoin protocol places a great emphasis on privacy and anonymity, and reducing the power 
of institutionalized authorities, it is often considered as the technological manifestation of the ‘libertarian 
dream’ (De Filippi, 2014). However, the protocol in itself is politically agnostic, in the sense that it can 
be easily seen through the lens of the libertarian Right wing, that exhibits general mistrust and is 
negatively inclined toward state control, as well as through the lens of the pacifist Left wing, challenging 
the oligopoly and disrupting the status quo (Coleman and Golub, 2008; De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016). 
True to this agnosticism, Cypherpunks may be radical libertarians, anarcho-capitalists, or socialists, 
which is also reflected in a recent survey on the political leanings of Bitcoin adopters, where the majority 
identify themselves as Liberals (CoinDesk, 2018). 
3 Theoretical Background  
3.1 Power and Technology: the Foucauldian Approach 
Traditionally, within the Information Systems domain, the Foucauldian approach to power has been 
quite influential. For example, its influence can be seen clearly in Zuboff’s work (Zuboff, 1988), where 
information systems are discussed as machines with the power to automate and informate, and which 
can be used for discipline, monitoring and surveillance (Doolin, 2004). According to Foucault, power is 
relational, and it exists only when exercised (Foucault, 1979). In other words, it entails the capacity to 
act, it suggests resistance (Willcocks, 2004) and exists in and stems from within social relationships 
(Doolin, 2004). As such, it lives within the knowledge, practices and technologies that impact on others 
and their capacity to act (Hindess, 1996). However, due to social relationships and practices, power 
becomes internalised, and its impact can be observed not only when directly exercised, but also when 
experienced through its apparatuses (Doolin, 2004). 
Foucault’s work has received several criticisms, with some of them having been addressed by Foucault 
himself in his later writings. In what follows we discuss those that pertain to this study and our own 
conceptualisation of power, later presented. 
As discussed by Willcocks, the Foucauldian approach to power presents certain difficulties in applying 
it (Willcocks, 2004). He notes that if indeed power is ever present, then “all social and cultural 
phenomena become reducible to power relations” (Willcocks, 2004, p. 262), where agency is either 
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understated or dismissed (Best, 1994). Willcocks also draws from Reed (1998) to note that the poor 
attention to agency further underestimates the relationship between agency and structure. As a result, it 
is impossible to investigate into and assess the differences between social actions and structural 
constraints, and therefore such an approach does not allow researchers understand how material and 
social constructions are either supported or constrained by agents, and in the case of information 
systems, technology. Further, in Foucauldian terms, power is treated in a somewhat flat manner, without 
attention to the hierarchical nature of institutions, the state etc., while explicitly rejecting the notion of 
underlying structures, and generative mechanisms that impact on the exercise of power and the potential 
outcomes (Sayer, 2012). 
This later point with regards to agents’ and technologies’ constraining or supportive role is of increased 
importance for the field of ICTs. Technologies should be seen as interacting with the individual, as part 
of a process, whereby both the technology and the individual get redefined as a result of their interaction 
and exposure to each other. In this context, the technology itself merely mediates the will and actions of 
the individual (Latour, 1994) and social relations (Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2011), based on how this 
technology has been designed by others, supporting certain actions and restricting others. As such, 
technologies can be seen, not simply as means to control and monitor but rather as objects that, on the 
one hand, adhere to certain societal and organisational norms while on the other hand, empower, being 
the tools and providing the space and opportunities to act (Bloomfield and Coombs, 1992). 
3.2 A Critical Realism Perspective of Power 
Our own conceptualisation of power is understood through the lens of critical realism (Palermo, 2007; 
Sayer, 2012), which addresses the criticisms on the Foucauldian approach, especially with regards to 
the constraining structures and mechanisms, and causality. Power can be considered as the ability to do 
or not do something (power to act). Within the context of interpersonal relationships, power translates 
into the ability to influence others’ actions as well (power over somebody). Power, more explicitly, can 
be described as the decision-making set that allows an agent to adopt a potential set of actions (Palermo, 
2007). Such an agent can be an individual, a financial institution, a state, or any other type of entity. 
Therefore, power over somebody entails that an agent can have and exercise power over somebody only 
when there is a dependency relationship, i.e., when the an individual is dependent on whatever actions 
another individual chooses to adopt from their decision-making set. Practically speaking, this may entail 
influence on another individual’s goals and actions, or influence and impact on their own decision-
making set (Palermo, 2007, 2014). As a result, power to act and power over somebody are inescapably 
interwoven, because power over somebody essentially depends on the distribution of power to act within 
a given system, such as society (Sayer, 2012).  
To date, there are different approaches to power, ranging from its non-existence within a capitalistic 
system, to existing solely within a bounded system (e.g., a firm), and even being ubiquitous. Such 
approaches depend largely on one’s understanding with regards to the existence or absence of 
interpersonal relationships, which in capitalism and perfectly competitive markets are seen as non-
existent, and therefore power to act is unrestricted (Palermo, 2014). This stems from the idea that one 
cannot exercise their authority over others in order to dictate a certain action, as individuals may opt to 
disengage from the relationship and therefore resist the exercised authority (Vatiero, 2010). However, 
the modern society is characterised by asymmetries (Gershenson, 2015) and power is typically unevenly 
distributed (Palermo, 2007). As a result, these asymmetries give way to power over others within 
interpersonal relationships. The important point then becomes what is the extent and the intensity of 
power, i.e., how many individuals’ decision making and actions can potentially be restricted as a result 
of a single agent (extent) and would be the potential impacts and consequences should this agent decides 
to exercise their power over others (intensity).  
The above description of power and power relations is in line with the critical realism approach (Mingers 
and Standing, 2017; Sayer, 2012). Critical realism has been recently attracting the interest within the IS 
literature, particularly thanks to its potential to provide mechanism-based causal explanations for 
phenomena. Critical realism puts forth the idea that the world exits independently from our own 
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knowledge of it and that we are able to observe only a fraction of it. This suggests in turn that structures 
and entities exist independently and can be understood solely through our own subjective lens that has 
been ingrained with our sociocultural perceptions (Mingers, 2004). In other words, critical realism 
differentiates between the real, the actual and the empirical domains of a phenomenon (see Figure 1 for 
the stratification of the domains). The real denotes the causal generative mechanisms that make things 
happen, and can be ideas and structures, among other things, which may or may not be observable by 
us (Mingers and Standing, 2017). Whether these generative mechanisms get activated depends on the 
contextual factors of the phenomenon, and therefore they may or may not lead to changes. Drawing 
from prior knowledge, experience and other observations, the researcher is then able to appreciate the 
causal explanations behind the investigated phenomenon (Volkoff and Strong, 2013). The actual domain 
denotes the temporary generated events that result from the generative mechanisms and finally the 
empirical domain is the subset of the events that we as researchers are able to observe (Mingers and 
Standing, 2017). In brief, the actual domain contains the events that can potentially occur but the 
empirical domain contains those that both occur and are observed (Mingers et al., 2013), and therefore 
one can argue that critical realism combines positivism and interpretivism. 
 
 
Figure 1. Domains of the real, the actual and the empirical, adapted from Mingers (2004). 
 
One of the most critical elements of critical realism is that of generative mechanisms, which is missing 
from the Foucauldian approach. Therefore, the ontology of critical realism can help overcome these 
shortcomings (Sayer, 2012). These mechanisms can be investigated through retroductive reasoning, 
whereby the researcher looks into an observed event and attempts to theorise around them and their 
causal explanation (Mingers, 2004). It is quite possible that there is a number of generative mechanisms 
that can potentially explain an outcome, but the researcher needs to focus only on those that are directly 
relevant to the investigated phenomenon (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013) and the underlying contextual 
conditions (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). 
Along these lines, within the context of an investigation into power, an important aspect is whether 
power is activated, which depends on the existence of absence of dependencies and relations among 
actors. In turn, when power is activated, one needs to assess to what extent the subject is susceptible to 
the exercised power (Sayer, 2012). As a result, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is no 
deterministic effect between the exercise of power and whatever outcomes may or may not occur. 
Instead, what exactly is the outcome depends on the contextual conditions (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 
2013). 
More specifically, the power to act (individual decision-making sets) and their interdependencies create 
a larger decision-making system, where the relationship between agents can be shaped in many different 
ways. One agent may proceed with a set of actions that simply are unavailable to other agents. In 
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addition, one agent may have imposed constraints on them on what action they can actually pursue, 
while the same constraints may not exist for other agents, as a result of others’ power over them. In other 
words, within a single decision-making system, there may be numerous constraints, asymmetrically 
distributed across agents.  
In this paper, our aim is to illustrate the structures and mechanisms that govern the power distribution 
in the Bitcoin protocol. We posit that such an asymmetric distribution of constraints do exist within the 
Bitcoin protocol as a result of the technology as designed and used. In what follows we discuss such 
non-observable entities that exist in the domain of the real, and specifically constraining structures, 
constraining mechanisms and the system of power in relation to the Bitcoin protocol. In doing so, we 
showcase that the technology as used is misaligned with its philosophical underpinnings.  
4 Bitcoin as a System of Power   
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed description of the Bitcoin protocol in its entirety. 
However, we will discuss in this section those features and functions of the protocol, which, through the 
lens of critical realism, act as the mechanisms and structures in the real domain that transform the Bitcoin 
protocol into an observed system of power.  
4.1 Constraining Structures 
While the Foucauldian approach to power rejects the concept of causality with regards to power, Sayer 
stresses “the importance of structures in the generation of power” (Sayer, 2012, p. 180) in order to 
understand power itself. This importance stems from the fact that the power of an entity exists “in virtue 
of the structure of [that entity]” (Sayer, 2012, p. 181) and is dependent upon exogenous structures, 
especially enduring ones that interact with endogenous structures. 
In the case of the Bitcoin protocol, there are two major components that relate to the purposes of our 
study; proof of work and block selection1. The Proof of Work (PoW) is the consensus algorithm for the 
confirmation of transactions and for the minting process of new bitcoins (Reid and Harrigan, 2013). The 
process requires that each peer of the network vote with their computing power, by solving proof of 
work instances and thus creating the appropriate blocks in the chain. The Bitcoin protocol uses more 
specifically the Hashcash system. Based on this system, the miners need to complete a proof of work 
that covers all the transactions in the block (Bitcoin Wiki, 2019). The protocol further introduces the 
concept of difficulty, which dictates the amount of work required for the identification of a new block. 
Therefore, this process becomes computationally expensive, in terms of skills, time and the financial 
resources required to set up and run the necessary infrastructure (Gervais et al., 2016), which often 
includes advanced GP-GPU and ASICs, specifically developed for bitcoin mining. In the early years, 
mining could take place through the graphics card mounted on the computer (GPU), which could take 
up the computations necessary for solving the puzzles and the transaction blocks. However, following 
the huge hype that began surrounding the Bitcoin, as many users jumped on the mining bandwagon, the 
prices of graphic cards exploded, making the acquiring of a good graphic card quite expensive. In 
addition, as the mining process increases in difficulty every so many years, in order to maintain the 
steady supply of bitcoins, the typical graphics cards can no longer support any mining – at least not in 
any way that makes financial sense for the individual. As a result, another approach has surfaced, that 
of using ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuits) mining. ASICs are designed solely for the 
purpose of mining bitcoins at full speed, while consuming as little power as possible. Of course, they 
are expensive and still require a lot of time to mine coins.  
As a result, based on the overall constraints imposed by the PoW, there is a high threat with regards to 
the centralisation of mining power to few miners only and mining pools (Bitcoin Wiki, 2019), that have 
access to additional resources than the average user, which in turn transforms this into an oligopoly 
(Arnosti and Weinberg, 2018). This undermines the central tenet of the cypherpunk movement and that 
 
1 Other important components, such as the Blockchain, private key cryptography and wallets, are not referred here as they are 
less relevant to the constraining structures of the protocol.  
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of the Bitcoin protocol, where the aim is meant to decentralise power and redistribute it from the few to 
the many, since it is not the many that have access to such skills and resources.  
Next, Block selection refers to the process through which miners compete against each other in order to 
receive the reward for mining the next block, and therefore add a new block in the blockchain. 
Essentially, miners attempt to identify and broadcast their proof of work for a given block before all 
other miners in the network, as only the first one who does so is able to receive the block reward. The 
requirement for the identification of the block is again computational power, as the miner is required to 
solve a cryptographic puzzle before all others (Eyal and Sirer, 2018), but further includes a random 
component (the solution is based on a nonce). For this reason, the process has often been described as 
random. However, while computational power and speed may not be the sole factors, the actual 
probability for a miner to get selected is still proportional to their share of the employed computational 
resources in the network (“The 3 or 4 fastest nodes' dominance would only be proportional to their share 
of the total CPU proof-of-worker. Anyone's chance of finding a solution at any time is proportional to 
their CPU proof-of-worker.” (Nakamoto, 2008b)), which allows for a trial and error approach in solving 
the code (Maurer et al., 2013). Because there are great incentives, the competition among miners to be 
the first to broadcast their proof of work is great. Therefore, to win this competition, a miner needs to 
dedicate increased computational power. In other words, the computational power, or lack thereof, 
further challenges the underpinnings of the Bitcoin protocol, by constraining and significantly 
decreasing the chances of a miner with less computational power being rewarded.  
Another point that relates to the constraining structures of the Bitcoin protocol has to do directly with 
the operation expenses. The process of mining consumes significant electrical power, both for the 
operation itself of the equipment, as well as for its cooling (Taylor, 2017). Understandably and 
depending on the exact geographical location of the miner, this translates into actual financial costs. For 
regions such as Europe for example, it is very much expensive to mine, while for other regions, such as 
China and Iceland, the costs are significantly lower, as a result of a combination of reasons, ranging 
from the actual climate conditions to the regulatory environment. Obviously, the incentive here would 
be that the received reward outweighs the costs spend for the mining. In other words, the reward must 
worth more than the electrical power spent to make financial sense for the user.  
It therefore follows that the code itself, while initially considered as a way to distribute power, due to 
the computational requirements that ever increase by design, results today in power becoming 
concentrated to the few (Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018). Through the lens of critical realism to power, 
one can argue that the structures discussed above belong in the domain of the real as they have enduring 
properties and impacts. Further, we note that the decision-making set of miners, especially those that 
individually mine bitcoins, is significantly restricted. It is not simply that the minimum requirements for 
mining are today excessively high. The competition itself emerging as a result of the technology as 
designed suggests that certain miners with increased computational power are better positioned to take 
advantage of the technology by mining bitcoins and thus receive rewards (power to act), while others 
with less computational power are unable to do so and can solely participate in the verification process, 
which is not resource intensive. 
4.2 Constraining Mechanisms  
The Bitcoin protocol today is about 10 years old and throughout this time updates and revisions to the 
code have been the subject of intense discussions among Bitcoin developers and enthusiasts. Generally, 
such changes in the code need to be agreed upon by a majority of miners who vote for the incorporation 
of said changes. For the purposes of the discussion around Bitcoin and power however, we can consider 
that the constraining structures previously discussed have remained stable over time, with minor 
changes. In such cases, where the constraining structures remain fairly stable over time, what need to be 
addressed are the constraining mechanisms that regulate and further propagate them (Palermo, 2007; 
Wrenn, 2017). 
Mechanisms, constraining mechanisms in this study, are meant to impact on one’s actions and have a 
causal force (Nicholson et al., 2013) that explains the observed events in the empirical domain. In this 
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sense, we posit that the asymmetric power distribution discussed earlier, stemming from the constraining 
structures, is the result of the constraining mechanisms residing externally from the protocol. Such 
mechanisms include, among others, external actors with an interest in the Bitcoin protocol, including 
the state, financial institutions, central banks, large Bitcoin exchanges, technologists and large mining 
pools, who manage to control in effect the production and the valuation of the Bitcoin and enhance or 
impair the technology’s status. These mechanisms get activated depending on their relationships with 
other entities, such as the end users, the Bitcoin structural elements and so on and so forth. The effect of 
these mechanisms is subject to the strength, vulnerabilities and relative positioning of the entities with 
which they relate, which can reinforce or block the power exercised (Sayer, 2012). These mechanisms 
are discussed in the following sections in relation to the philosophical underpinnings of the protocol.  
4.2.1 The mechanism of identification and verification: back to deanonymisation 
The preservation of anonymity has been since the beginning the central idea behind the peer-to-peer 
electronic cash system proposed by Nakamoto. In addition, the inability to preserve anonymity within a 
perceived as corrupt state-driven payment system is what dictated for Cypherpunks the necessity to 
incorporate strong cryptographic techniques in their code and place their trust only in their code: 
“Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is fundamentally a private act. The 
act of encryption, in fact, removes information from the public realm. Even laws against cryptography 
reach only so far as a nation's border and the arm of its violence” (Hughes, 1993).  
In the original paper published by Nakamoto, there is no indication that online or brick and mortar 
cryptocurrency exchanges would be necessary or even desired. Rather, when the electronic cash system 
was launched, the idea was that Bitcoin users would be minting new coins themselves, which they would 
store locally on their personal devices. Through their devices, users would be able to transact directly 
with each other and without going through a financial institution of some kind (Nakamoto, 2008a). 
However, for a number of reasons, including convenience, self-efficacy, and usability, such 
cryptocurrency exchanges emerged as early as 2010 (Sedgwick, 2018). 
With the advent of such cryptocurrency exchanges, Bitcoin users begun acquiring bitcoins from them, 
trading fiat money for cryptocurrencies and using the exchanges’ wallets and transacting with others 
through them. Because of underlying risk concerns in transacting with unknown others and thanks to 
the convenience offered in locating buyers and sellers, many users, who hold their funds in hardware 
(offline) or hot (online) wallets, transfer their funds, even momentarily, to their online exchange 
accounts to complete transactions. However, to access such services, the increased majority of these 
exchanges require that users identify and verify themselves by providing their personal details, including 
name, address, nationality and a copy of a government ID (e.g., national ID, driving licence, passport), 
in an effort to satisfy Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements. While these are not broadcasted on 
the blockchain when a transaction occurs, it is possible to trace back the transaction itself and then link 
it to the sender and the recipient of the transaction. Vidan and Lehdonvirta (2018) refer to these 
exchanges as ‘gatekeepers’ who break the protocol’s promise of anonymity. Others have shown that 
there is a discrepancy between potential and actual anonymity because it is possible, with enough 
resources, to link addresses of the same user together and in time identify large entities and their 
interactions (Meiklejohn et al., 2016). In addition, Jeff Garzik, a member of the Bitcoin core 
development team has noted that with today’s statistical analysis and network analysis techniques, it is 
possible to identify Bitcoin users (Maurer et al., 2013).  
We call this the mechanism of identification and verification. The above discussion reveals that while 
the technology has been developed as an attempt to preserve the anonymity of participants, externally 
from it, there is a still the need for the identification and verification of the transacting parties. 
Positioning this within the context of critical realism, the mechanism of identification and verification 
gets activated when there is a requirement to align with long established regulatory frameworks (KYC, 
in the case of cryptocurrency online exchanges), as well as to track fraudulent and illicit activities (which 
the state and society have an interest to deter and interrupt). As a result, what occurs is that external to 
the technology measures are still in place, and the verification of the trustworthiness of users and the 
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legality of the transactions is still mandatory; the difference is that the verifying authority has shifted 
from the state to these exchanges. What is important for our discussion on power is that these exchanges, 
while part of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network enjoy greater leverage than individual users, and can 
exercise their power over others by choosing to include or exclude individuals on the basis of the laters’ 
perceived trustworthiness.  
One could argue that users could choose not use these exchanges and transact directly with each other. 
Along these lines, it needs to be noted that there are several exchanges that do not require any 
authentication, and others that allow for offline transactions. In such cases however users exchange the 
preservation of their anonymity for higher fees and commissions, and normally less easy to use 
interfaces. In addition, in the case of direct transactions, the transacting parties will further need to trust 
each other, as the technology cannot ensure that e.g., the seller will fulfil the transaction by delivering 
the product or service paid for. These elements put together constrain significantly Bitcoin users’ power 
to act. 
4.2.2 The mechanism of cost effectiveness: back to centralisation 
Early Bitcoin adopters had the opportunity to mine bitcoins with significantly decreased difficulty and 
fewer technological requirements. Therefore, they were able to acquire bitcoins through mining with 
considerably lower costs. Currently, because of the increased starting costs and operational costs, 
together with the increased competition for identifying the next block to mine and the decrease in the 
reward, the overall costs of mining individually outweigh potential profits (Taylor, 2017). It is therefore 
highly unusual to be an individual miner, and what is observed is that Bitcoin miners tend to join large 
mining pools. Through such mining pools, individual users join their efforts with other miners and pool 
their computational resources, and therefore hashing power. In turn, this brings them, as a group, in a 
better position to defeat their competition in mining and identifying the next block, and therefore receive 
the mining reward (Maurer et al., 2013). The reward itself is directed to the mining pool rather to any 
individual miner within that pool, but each of them receive a fraction of the reward according to their 
contribution and the rewarding scheme adopted by the pool (Dziembowski, 2015). 
Figure 2 show the market share of the most popular Bitcoin mining pools. Based on these data, we see 
that today exist some very large mining pools, such as BTC.com, AntPool and SlushPool. These large 
pools are followed by several smaller ones, along the dimensions of hashing power and number of blocks 
identified. In 2016, a study has found that 75% of the hashing power resided in China and Chinese 
mining pools (De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016). In other words, not only the computational power today 
is concentrated into few mining pools but these pools, for a number of reasons, are mostly concentrated 
in a single country (Peck, 2017; Tuwiner, 2019). CoinMetrics have investigated the concentration of 
hashing power and the mining pools into greater detail, and have identified some additional interesting 
patterns (Figure 3): a) large mining pools may come and go, but there are some that seem quite persistent 
over time such as F2Pool and Slushpool, thus being more attractive to prospective miners as a result of 
their longevity, and b) it is difficult to assess real world power concentration just by looking into the 
power distribution across pools, because some, such as Antpool and BTC.com are owned by the same 
company, Bitmain (Coinmetrics, 2019). In other words, Bitmain owns the largest and second largest 
mining pools today, enjoying a significant leverage over the mining process.  
The concentration of hashing power to a few large mining pools is a concern for many Bitcoin 
researchers with regards the security of its Blockchain. When more than 50% of the network’s hashing 
power is concentrated by a single entity, then this entity is able to control the Blockchain through a 
number of ways: e.g., the entity is able to prevent the confirmations of transactions, thus leading to 
transactions being rejected, and they are able to reverse transactions even if these have been completed. 
Most importantly, in such an event, double spending of coins could be possible, which was one of the 
major problems that the Bitcoin has managed to solve for digital cash systems (Nakamoto, 2008a). 
Therefore, the concentration of power by few mining pools is not only a very obvious threat for the 
decentralised nature of the Bitcoin, but also creates a risk for the security of the Blockchain and the 
Bitcoin payment system in general (Conti et al., 2018; Eyal and Sirer, 2018). 
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Figure 2. Bitcoin hashrate distribution in May 10, 2019. ‘Unknown’ means that Blockchain.info 
was unable to determine the origin. Source: https://www.blockchain.com/explorer 
(accessed on 10/05/2019). 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of hashing power among mining pools (until January 7, 2019). Source: 
(Coinmetrics, 2019). 
 
We call this the mechanism of cost effectiveness. Based on the discussion above, we have shown that 
as a result of increasing costs and decreasing rewards, the miners do not have many options in order to 
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receive financial gains and incentives towards keep on mining. Today, the only visible way for making 
profits and operating a financially viable mining operation is that of joining a mining pool, which 
progressively leads to the establishment of large groups of users, i.e., large mining pools, all working 
together in an effort to mine the next block. In other words, this mechanism gets activated when the ratio 
of financial gains to operational costs decreases overall, quite possibly converging to zero (Derks et al., 
2018), and when operational costs exceed financial gains, which functions as a cut-off point after which 
mining is a cost for the miner. For simple users, the large mining pools exert power over them as the 
pool or the combination of pools are able to control confirmations, and transactions. For individual 
miners, the impact is similar with mining pools reducing the formers’ opportunities to mine and receive 
rewards, as the later leverages greater hashing power. 
A subsequent discussion of power through the lens of critical realism would then be on the decision 
making of miners for joining a mining pool, in order to appreciate the extent of their power to act to join 
a certain pool and the extent and the intensity of the power of the mining pools over miners. Typically, 
there are two main factors that play into one’s decision making. The first has to do with the scheme the 
pool operates for paying out the reward and the fee it deducts. The second has to do with the size of the 
pool, i.e., how many peers comprise the pool, which is an indication of its hashing power (bitcoin wiki, 
2011). Intuitively, we argue that prospective miners would be more inclined to join a pool with an 
established history such as Slush Pool, or a pool that has a low fee and a large pay out reward. There are 
different approaches to the fees. Some pools, such as Slush Pool require a 2% fee but share all transaction 
fees with its miners, whereas Ant Pool does not charge any fees, but does not share transaction fees. 
Next, the mining reward is computed based on the contribution of the miner toward the identification of 
a block, in other words, it is based on the hardware the miner owns and uses for mining. Therefore a 
single miner may wish to trade stability for increased pay outs, or vice versa. In all cases, miners willing 
to join a pool enjoy greater power to act and decide which pool to join, as they can even change pools. 
4.2.3 What is it good for? The mechanism of perceptions 
Within the context of examining the Bitcoin protocol as a system of power, we have shown so far that 
power to act and power over somebody exists as a result of endogenous, enduring structures and 
specifically as a result of some of its core components. We have further addressed how two major 
constraining mechanisms emerge as a result of these constraining structures, restricting miners’ and 
users’ power to act. Another constraining mechanism however stems from exogenous structures, such 
as the state, financial institutions, central banks, and technologists, who leverage their power over their 
audience and the public and inescapably influence the laters’ perceptions.  
When the Bitcoin protocol was first introduced, it was seen as a solution for preserving the anonymity 
in transactions, for the problem of power centralisation in the hands of the few, and as a way to overcome 
issues that stem from inflation and deflation. Yet, today, the Bitcoin is mostly discussed in relation to 
two main things as a result of its affordances. The first has to with fraudulent activities and illicit trading 
(e.g., Burge, 2015), and the second with its potential to provide huge returns for investors (but also 
losses) (Gerlach et al., 2018). 
The Bitcoin protocol has been the subject of several discussions so far in relation to illicit trading, 
fraudulent activities and generally activities that appear to be against the status quo. One of the first 
events that have brought the Bitcoin into the general public’s attention is presumably the establishment 
of Silk Road, an online marketplace for the trade of illicit goods, and its subsequent shutdown (Maurer 
et al., 2013). Silk Road users were transacting with each other using bitcoins in an effort to remain 
anonymous. However, since the traded goods were actually illicit (guns, drugs etc.), Silk Road naturally 
attracted the interest of law enforcement, who then were successful in not only shutting down the market 
but also tracking and identifying sellers and buyers (Meiklejohn et al., 2016). In addition, bitcoins have 
been widely used for donating to causes that may seem as threatening the establishment, such as 
WikiLeaks’ operations, Julian Assange’s, Edward Snowden’s and Ross Ulbricht’s defence funds, with 
the cryptocurrency being seen as “a censorship-resistant digital currency” (Maurer et al., 2013, p. 266). 
While such events supported the popularity of the Bitcoin to grow, they have also facilitated 
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governmental agencies, regulators and financial actors to link, in the public’s mind, the technology to 
fraudulent activities.  
Next, the Bitcoin is often discussed in the media in relation to its price, the price’s volatility, its use as 
an investment as well as its potential to disrupt different industries. Thus far, it seems there is an 
increased majority that agrees in that the Bitcoin does not perform well as a medium of exchange due 
to its price volatility (Maurer et al., 2013). Others approach it as an instrument to speculate on its price 
and therefore gain and maximise their profits in the process (De Filippi and Loveluck, 2016). However, 
investing in Bitcoin can be a very risky endeavour and not always profitable. For many, the Bitcoin has 
no intrinsic value and therefore, its price may be justified or explained by speculative behaviour that 
often leads to price bubbles (Cheah and Fry, 2015; Shahzad et al., 2019). In addition, financial 
institutions seem less ready to invest in Bitcoin (although the same cannot be said for the Blockchain 
(Du et al., 2019)) due to concerns regarding the regulatory environment, taxing and accounting (Shahzad 
et al., 2019), which therefore indicates that more established players put less trust in the technology. 
Finally, a number of studies have linked Bitcoin’s price to speculation by investors, who seek to make 
great profits in less time with lower investment costs (Baur et al., 2018; de la Horra et al., 2019). 
However, this may lead to adverse effects with investors being exposed to the usual market risks 
(Koutmos, 2019), especially if one ascribes to the notion that the Bitcoin has no intrinsic value. 
While the above discussion can be telling with regards the influence of such players on any market, for 
us it is useful for considering their impact, not on the price of the Bitcoin, but instead on the public’s 
opinion regarding the technology. Because of the complexity of the technology, and because it still 
hasn’t been widely adopted, novice users are less ready to place their trust in the Bitcoin (Alshamsi and 
Andras, 2019), and more likely to be influenced by media hype, which admittedly focuses on the more 
dystopian side of the Bitcoin (Cameron and Trinh, 2017). We call this the mechanism of influencing 
perceptions, that drives the increased majority of novice users to think of the Bitcoin as something 
without value, that cannot be used as an electronic payment system, and something to steer away from 
since the vernacular typically links it to less positive stories. In line with the critical realism’s view of 
power, it is reasonable to suggest that the influence of exogenous structures, such as financial 
institutions, central banks, media and technologists, exerts a disproportionate power over potential users 
and the wider public. In the short term, this restricts the public from using the Bitcoin as a payment 
system, because it is still not widely accepted by merchants, banks and the state as ‘money’, or medium 
of exchange, especially because of their perceptions regarding its risky nature. In the long term,  
4.3 System of Power: the interaction of structures and mechanisms 
The constraining structures and the constraining mechanisms provide the underlying principles for 
systems of power (Palermo, 2007). In the case of the Bitcoin, the constraining structures of Proof of 
Work and Block Selection, and the constraining mechanisms of identification and verification, cost 
effectiveness, and perceptions make the Protocol a system of power. Against this background, power to 
act and power over somebody continuously interact and reinforce each other.  
With regards to the mechanism of cost effectiveness, we see that under the pressure of receiving the 
mining reward, miners compete against each other in order to be the first to solve the cryptographic 
puzzle (constraining structure of Proof of Work) as well as for identifying the next block (Block 
Selection). In this race, due to the increasing costs and the increasing difficulty, the mechanism of cost 
effectiveness gets activated, where miners work collaboratively, in effect against other mining pools, in 
order to create economies of scale and take advantage of the consolidated computing power.  
Next, as far as the mechanism of identification and verification is concerned, we note that the Proof of 
Work, as a function in itself, does not require any more information than what is included in a 
transaction. Transactions themselves are executed and verified using public key cryptography, where 
ownership of any fraction of bitcoin is proved by signing the broadcasted transaction with the paired 
private key (Biryukov and Pustogarov, 2015). In addition, cryptocurrency exchanges do not provide 
their services for free, but instead apply a fee to a every transaction that goes through them. These two 
points combined activate the mechanism of identification and verification because of two reasons. First, 
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despite that the Bitcoin is pseudonymous rather than purely anonymous, it is still difficult to link one’s 
real world identity to the Bitcoin wallet. Second, cryptocurrency exchanges and Bitcoin users can have 
significant profits as a result of their trading activities, but due to pseudonymity, taxation becomes 
increasingly difficult. However, the state, central banks and other financial institutions have a stake on 
taxation and general regulation: for the state and central banks, taxation of bitcoins is a source of income; 
for financial institutions, cryptocurrency exchanges may well seem as brokers, offering an alternative 
trading system to their own with fewer restrictions for participants (Shapiro, 2018) and therefore seem 
more attractive for trading and investments. In both cases, the constraining structure activates the 
mechanism of identification and verification. 
In relation to this, the mechanism of perceptions further reinforces the mechanism of identification and 
verification. The hype that surrounds the Bitcoin, the volatility of its price that can lead equally to great 
profits and great losses, as well as the lack of regulation and its affordance to be used in illicit activities, 
further feed into the mechanism of identification and verification, by means of questioning its legitimacy 
(DeVries, 2016). This requires that Bitcoin users trading through exchanges identify themselves so that 
their activities can be traced and verified. In many cases, this is also desired by the users themselves, as 
it is still difficult for several of them to trust unknown transacting parties that operate at the margins of 
regulation (Zamani and Babatsikos, 2017). However, what we note here is that the mechanisms 
themselves get activated as a result of the constraining structures, but further interact with each other, 
reinforcing each other. 
5 Conclusions  
In this study, we have focused our attention on the underlying constraining structures and constraining 
mechanisms that transform the Bitcoin protocol into a system of power. As raised by other researchers,  
technologies are rarely used and employed as originally designed or even imagined (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991), and our study offers further confirmation. However, we also show that the main 
components of a technology, in this case of the Bitcoin protocol, can act as constraints with regards to 
restricting users’ power to act in a manner that is in line with the Bitcoin’s philosophical underpinnings.  
We have further shown that some constraining mechanisms, that exist independently from these 
structures and the protocol, possess and exercise their power over users and miners, reinforcing each 
other and further restricting users’ and miners’ power to act. In doing so, we have shown that while the 
Bitcoin protocol was developed and launched with the aim to decentralise power and distribute it to 
individual users and citizens, due to such mechanisms, power has instead shifted from more traditional 
actors, such as the state, to newcomers, such as cryptocurrency exchanges. Focusing specifically on the 
mechanism of identification and verification, we see that such actors have taken up the role of controllers 
or ‘gatekeepers’ (Vidan and Lehdonvirta, 2018), previously exercised by the state and central banks. 
However, their role as a controller and this mechanism are further reinforced by other mechanisms, such 
as the one of perceptions, where exchanges, while exercising their power over users, are required to do 
so but the enduring power of the state.    
We have built our study drawing from critical realism. It is therefore necessary to note that, while the 
identified mechanisms and structures exist independently within the domain of the real, we can only 
observe a fraction of this domain. In other words, we expect that there will be additional structures and 
mechanisms that our study has not revealed nor addressed, due to our own subjective lens (Mingers, 
2004) and because different contextual conditions may be required to activate them and bring them into 
the fore. Further, we have based our study solely on phenomena that presently both occur and are 
observable (actual domain). However, Mingers and Standing (2017) note that other phenomena, 
temporary in nature, may be generated by the identified generative mechanisms (actual domain) without 
being observable. In continuing with a similar analysis in the future, it would useful to cast a wider net 
across the cryptocurrency landscape, the legal and regulatory environment as well the market, in order 
to identify a larger set of tendencies, consequences and associations among the components of the 
Bitcoin system and between them and the different financial and social relationships of the involved 
actors.  
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